PANAY ISLAND, Philippines
Adair, at San Francisco, on 2 August returned to sea carrying replacements to the Fleet. On the day she crossed the International Dateline, 14/15 August, the Japanese capitulated; and hostilities formally ended. Adair dropped off her passengers at Eniwetok on 5 September and continued on to the Philippines. She made stops at Tacloban on Luzon, Guiuan on Samar, and at Panay Island before clearing the archipelago* on 14 September with occupation troops embarked for Korea.

*archipelago; an expanse of water with many scattered islands - Malay archipelago in SE Asia includes Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, Moluccas, & Timor; usually considered as including also the Philippines & sometimes New Guinea 

 

The Boat Pool at Panay looked very handy from the fantail of the ADAIR


40TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Leaving Luzon, 15 March, 1945, to cut behind the Japanese, the Division landed on Panay Island on the 18th and knocked out Japanese resistance within 10 days, seizing airfields at Santa Barbara and Mandurriao. On 29 March, it landed at Pulupandan, Negros, advanced through Bacolod toward Talisay, which it secured by 2 April 1945. After mopping up on Negros Island, the Division returned to Panay in June and July 1945. In September 1945, the Division moved to Korea for occupation duty. 


1st & 2nd Filipino Infantry Regiments, U.S. Army

Pursuant to instructions, S-2 & S-3, 1st Rcn Bn Sp Trs, the following REPORT OF OPERATIONS, Weather Team under M/Sgt. Isidoro D. Dacquel, R-5274389, is hereby submitted:

We, (M/Sgt Dacquel, S/Sgt Francisca, Sgt Kintanar and Cpl Salvacion), left Tabragalba, Queensland Australia, on 7 June 1944 and boarded the submarine "Norwhall" at Darwin 8 June for the Philippines. We went out of our way to shell the oil refineries at Cer M arriving off Panay waters 20 June 1944.

Promptly at 1800 that memorable day, we surface off Lipata, a small town on the west central coast of Panay and started unloading our precious cargoes under cover of darkness. The guerrillas showed neither planning nor organization in their efforts to unload the cargoes of the submarine, so fifty tons of her cargoes were thrown overboard. They were concerned more of looting the cargoes than of unloading. The officer in charge of the unloading was one, Lt. Col. Cerilo Garcia, formerly the Philippines Constabulary and now a sub-guerrilla Chief of Panay.

The Japs were at Lipata while our sub was being unloaded and only the good fighting abilities of one Capt. Cadjao and his men were we able to land. This officer and his brave men repeatedly made themselves conspicuous by their successful encounters with the enemy time and time again hereafter but for all these good work and especially this one, he and his men were never compensated nor even commended. The sub was able to sink two Jap troopships that following morning before it submerged for her return trip; otherwise, I would not have been able to write this report for surely they would have taken cared of us before we could even go any further.

We landed at 0400 21 June 1944. At 1000 the Japs machine gunned and straffed us and later dropped a bomb at our supply dump but missed by a hundred feet. We took to the hills immediately and stayed there under cover for three days until one Sgt. Ramos, a SWPA man, sent us word that we are moving to Bitadtun, a small barrio further up the coast where one Lt. Mendoza, Philippine Army, was maintaining "a sort of a radio station". We stayed there for a week awaiting instructions from GHQ and at the same time trying to locate our instruments which were separated from us in the made scramble for safety. The instructions from GHQ came but was withheld from us for a week before it was revealed to us. When they told us we were moving to Solido, still further north and mid-central northern Panay. So, from Bitadtun to Solido we moved, set the station and began operations after too much bickering about how our reports should be handled. Garcia and one 1st Lt. Irineo Ames insisted on running our mission to suit themselves while I remained adamant and insisted on running it according to my "Operational Instructions"; GHQ backed us up and we won.

Everything went on smoothly for a spell but soon the Japs began fishing us off the air. Then one night the guerrilla intelligence told us the Japs were coming after us. We escaped under cover of darkness and took the northwesterly direction on the provincial road towards Bigon, a small barrio located at the northern shore of the northwestern tip of Panay. Here we set our station only for a few days in danger of being captured. I split my party in two; S/Sgt. Francisca and Sgt. Kintanar took the overland route through winding trails across the high mountains towards Pucio Point; while Cpl. Salvacion and I redoubled back on the provincial road to Pandan on the west coast of Panay thence along the shore northward to Ijbertad. This was in mid September. We set up our station at Libertad moving twice in that vicinity until Christmas Day, 1944 when we moved to Pucio Point.

In the meantime, under instructions from GHQ, S/Sgt. Francisca and Sgt. Kintanar were ordered to Tapaz center of Panay to establish station "Bahlana 005". That left Cpt. Salvacion and myself running "Bahala na 004" with three-inpone mission; Weather, Air & Coast Watch; while S/Sgt. Francisca and Sgt. Kintanar, weather observations only.

Cpt. Salvacion and I operated at Pucio Point until 22 April, 1945, when under orders from Garcia, our guerrilla station complement left us to shift for ourselves. Col. Peralta, the guerrilla chief of Panay, sent us a message to report to Iloilo but provided no means of getting there. We left Mindoro at 0900 24 May, 1945 and arrived at Hollandia, New Guinea at 1700 25 May, stopping at Tacloban, Leyte overnight. At Tacloban, my shirt, with all my priced possession was stolen from me between 2330 and 0100. We stayed at Six Camp, Troop Movement, Casual Det, Tent 56.


The above is just my "Operational Report" in brief. Lots of details have been omitted. There are three matters I would like to take up and tell the world. First, the cooperation we got from the Guerrilla Chiefs of Panay with regards to our mission; second, what became of the supplies sent to Panay by sub; and third and last but not least, the people of Panay the civilians their sufferings and privations resulting from the maltreatment they received from the guerrillas as well as from the enemy.

Lt. Col. Garcia and 1st Lt. Ames gave practically little or no cooperation to our mission. Lt. Irineo Ames was openly working against us in all of our endeavors. The Lt. Colonel was indifferent to all our efforts. As a Commander of Troops, he displayed lack of planning and organization and delighted only in skinning his officers in their poker game parties daily. Like Lt. Ames, he is untrustworthy, undependable and shifty. He systematically stripped my station of its equipment and supplies making it almost impossible to continue operations until I got to Mindoro by sailboat to obtain medicine, food and equipment. According to memo I received from Col. Peralta from the beginning, he is supposed to protect us, feed us and quarter us. But this man took our "K" rations and left us nothing to eat the very day we landed. He even sent a man with instructions that we give him twenty-five pesos for which to buy food. We gave him the money, ate one meal out of it, then he disappeared with the money and all. He left us shift for ourselves for everything and we practically starved from the day we landed until that very day I got supplies from Mindoro the last week of January, 1945.

All of the supplies brought by our submarines were misappropriated by the guerrilla chief. Clothing, food, equipment, medicine and even arms and ammunitions found themselves in the hands of people not entitled to have them. Most of the clothing and medicines found there way in "Caches" and "Hideouts" of the principal guerrilla chiefs to be sold at fancy prices by agents especially favored by them. A pack of cigarettes was selling at twenty pesos; one gallon can of GI coffee, three hundred pesos; a bar of Palm Olive soap, forty-five pesos; toothbrush, twenty-five pesos each, a suit of khaki, one hundred and fifty pesos; half a "frasco" of lard, six pesos; a box of matches, five pesos; sulfanilamide, twenty-five pesos a tablet; and sausage, a peso a link.

Of all the supplies sent to us in Panay, we received only a small jar of ovaltine, a packet of razor blades and a cartoon of matches. GHQ shipped our supplies and equipment but when the sub got there, Garcia informed us that our supplies were thrown overboard at Cebu harbor when the sub went aground; and yet his house was stacked up to the ceiling with can goods. In that particular submarine that brought our supplies but did not get them, every box was opened in front of Garcia. He first hand-picked what he wanted out of that box and then divided what was left in that same box between Col. Peralta and himself. He hand-picked again his share of that division and then gave one-sixth of it to the troops his troops. The submarine that picked up the Americans who were shot down from the different parts of the Visayas and gathered at Libertad, was boarded exclusively by himself, his wife, his servants and his henchmen. From the sub they got plenty of food, medicines and odd and ends and yet there was absolutely nothing for anybody else. continues.....